I. OPENING

KEYNOTE ADDRESS
"The Unique Challenges of Maritime Security"

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Good morning everybody. As Paul said, it has been a pleasure for me to be part of this from the very beginning and to see it continuing. I think the two hundred or more people registered for this conference will help focus attention on the technological aspects and inferences of the MTS initiative.

When I look back on three and one-half years in this job so far, among those things that the U.S. Coast Guard and I as an organization can be proudest of, is the report that went to the Congress in September 1999. That report, a result of outreach to the maritime community throughout the country, as well as listening sessions and working groups, focused for the first time on the full spectrum of what we know about and need for our maritime transportation system. I want to thank all of you for hanging in there over these several years. It has been frustrating that since the report was sent to Congress, no one on the Hill has taken on the role of advocate to promote the entire package. I sometimes wonder whether we should have segmented the final product and sent it up in pieces, thereby providing an opportunity for subcommittees and committees to see a clear role for advocacy and sponsorship. That is not the approach we took, so today we are where we are. There is no doubt that the events of September 11 have caused the security piece to rise above all the other pieces of the MTS as the dimension of greatest concern to the nation at the moment.

My first obligation this morning is to note that over the course of the last seven weeks, as we have been attempting to methodically build a new maritime security game plan for the nation and for Governor Ridge and for the President, I have been especially proud to be part if this nation's larger maritime community. Whether it was on the day of September 11, when in New York Harbor folks came together—whether they were pilots, ferry boat operators, or USCG personnel—to serve the needs of an enormous number of people in Lower Manhattan. Whether it was Dick Bennis and his organizational efforts; whether it was individual sailors and seamen and merchant mariners from all parts of that harbor that morning, their willingness to shift gears and do what was necessary to assist the people in Manhattan was unbelievable. After losing its ability to do many of these things via landside transportation, we literally had to reestablish a transportation network around Lower Manhattan—it was accomplished by way of maritime people being willing to do what was necessary.

You probably heard some of the numbers—on a normal day in Manhattan, 186,000 people come and go to Manhattan from the water, primarily via ferry service, with the Staten Island Ferry carrying the largest share. On the morning of September 11, because of the combined efforts of the maritime community in the Port of New York and

New Jersey, over one million people were evacuated from South Manhattan – an astonishing figure in and of itself, let alone in the crisis atmosphere that existed that morning.

Since September 11, part of what we have been attempting to do is reestablish and itemize a clear set of goals that we think are important for the maritime security of our nation. It is one component of our search for whatever a new "normalcy" for port security is going to be. In doing so, we have honed in on four or five goals that I think are absolutely and enormously important. I will review those quickly before giving my prepared remarks on research and technology.

The first goal was to find a way to re-instill confidence in the American people that the maritime sector of their world was okay, that there was a comfort zone that could be established wherein those folks could feel secure about the maritime sector. In a sense, we were fortunate that on the 11th of September the bad guys chose a different means and venue than the maritime sector. There were a variety of different ways to render harm on this nation through the maritime sector, which I believe is perhaps both the most valuable and the most vulnerable. We need to find ways to deal with both of those notions to balance what is going to happen with respect to maritime security, together with the facilitation of commerce that is so vital to our nation's prosperity.

Secondly, we were very concerned about controlling the movement of vessels in all the ports, harbors, and waterways of the United States. We were and remain very concerned about establishing a greater presence there, both for the value it represents in deterrence, and the value it represents in response capabilities should any kind of an eventuality transpire. We were very concerned about inventorying the critical infrastructure within those ports and waterways and finding a way to prioritize that list. We need to be able to quickly acknowledge which pieces of that critical infrastructure are part of a federal system of guaranteeing security, and which are more appropriately dealt with by the lessees, owners or operators of the facilities involved. There is an infinite inventory, as you might imagine, from nuclear power plants, the Statue of Liberty and bridges, and container facilities and LNG terminals, and everything else across that spectrum.

Third, the Coast Guard, as an organization, fell back on our search and rescue instincts. We surged everything we had to the task and have been since backing away and finding what that new normalcy is, that new security profile that will require contributions not only from us but from many others as well. We have to identify the delta between what our 10th of September posture was and what the new normalcy will be – translate that into budgetary and resource requests to fit in the supplemental 2002 and 2003 budget as it goes by. The game plan is relatively straightforward and, as is always the case, the proof is in the details and so is the devil. That's what we have been working very hard on for Governor Ridge in the course of these last six or seven weeks.

The last element of that product required an enormous amount of outreach. I would imagine almost everyone in this

room has attended, over the course of the last several weeks, one or more of the many meetings that Paul Pluta has called to reach out to our maritime partners and help us all learn from each other, but understand fundamentally that at the end of the day, we all have a greater number of contributions to make to this higher security profile in our country. That is, in fact, the fundamental important piece to understand. There is no way that the Coast Guard will ever get all of the resources and assets necessary to be 100% secure in the ports and waterways of America. That is just never going to happen. Our challenge is to be, as called for in the MTS report, the collaborative leader in pulling people to the table and helping everyone collectively understand the network of contributions that must be made to that new higher security profile for our nation's ports and waterways. The outreach effort has been undertaken by Paul, at my direction, to reach into the maritime community as completely as we can and find the contributions appropriate to the task.

I'm delighted to be with you today also to discuss the technology. I think it is important for us to keep our nose to the grindstone as it relates to the overall MTS initiative. While security has found its way to the front burner for the moment, we cannot afford to set aside or to neglect any of the other elements Paul mentioned. Remember, if you will, that as our MTS report went forward, it fell into logical categories. It talked about coordination, safety, competitiveness, infrastructure, environmental and national security issues – those five or six categories became the collection points around which most of our data gathering and information gathering efforts actually focused when it was time to send the report to the Congress.

The challenge of security is arguably just one of the many concerns in the interest of a healthy and robust maritime transportation system and it is perhaps more important and more focused today as a result of 11th of September. There is no doubt that the recent attacks, the continuing threat, the fear of the unknown, and the simple notion that we don't know what we don't know, will keep the maritime security piece closer to the front burner than it ever has been before. It is therefore appropriate that we focus efforts on how technology can be used to meet the unique maritime security challenges confronting us today and into the future, while at the same time recognizing that all the other things -- efficiency and safety and environmental integrity -- are enormously important to our ports and waterways and must not be overlooked. Our ports will not be safe, efficient or clean unless they are sufficiently secure against this very amorphous and a bit unknown threat that continues to lurk around us.

The terror from the skies last month did not just kill thousands of innocent people and scar the skyline of New York City and Washington, D.C. It fundamentally changed our perception of security at home and around the world. No longer can the United States define security mainly as a projection of military might over there somewhere as part of an abroad notion of our national defense. The terrorists who aimed at our national symbols of economic and military strength struck with missiles made of the tools of our own prosperity. There is a message in there somewhere for all of

us. We must remember that those four aircraft took off from Boston, Newark and Dulles – not from points overseas – making it impossible to predict from where on the compass our next battle might come.

These tragic events clearly have forced us to reassess even our most basic definitions of national security and remake the means of achieving security for our nation's future. It has raised a burning question in everyone's mind about how do we prevent another attack. That question concerns us today and is a bit more specific – how do we meet the enormous challenge of providing maritime security against terrorism and other potential threats to the nation's maritime transportation system? In other words, we all have our fields of work, domains in which we work. Ours is on the water. Ours is the maritime world of the United States. How do we, those of us immersed in working in it and making our living in it, make a difference with respect to whether we can get ahead of the bad guy the next time?

Until recently, this notion of our national security being projected abroad rather than within our own borders has been very real. But following the recent attacks on our own cities, we now have a very good cause to be concerned about threats right under our own noses. This nation now faces the constant threat of terrorism as a means of coercion or retaliation just as much of the world has come to understand it routinely in the last 20-30-50 years. This is a situation that will likely continue for some time. As a nation that depends so heavily on oceans and sea-lanes as avenues of our prosperity, we know that whatever action we take in response must protect our ports and waterways and the ships that use them. They are just as important to our commerce with the world as airlines and trade centers, and clearly just as vulnerable. If you look at the statistics, as all of us did when we prepared our MTS report back in 1999, I would offer that the notion of value and vulnerability was very much in our minds all the way through that process. Almost $1.0 trillion worth of the United States' GDP is made up of contributions from the maritime sector -- $1.0 trillion. I have grown up living in the world of thousands and millions and we have found our way towards billions these days. But almost $1.0 trillion of the annual GDP of this nation is made up of contributions from the maritime sector. It is enormously valuable to our country and it is a fundamental building block to the prosperity that we have enjoyed for so many years.

The insidious nature of terror as a weapon is that even without being used, it can conjure all sorts of mayhem in the minds of its would-be victims. It is very different for us to be contemplating and trying to figure out how to go about guarding ourselves from whatever horrors the mind can imagine. It is almost easy to think in terms now of Cold War applications of a clear enemy with a clear notion that you can focus on and put all the great analytical minds to work to help us understand those things. The amorphous nature of the asymmetrics is perhaps its most challenging characteristic. Common to all the threats that we deal with on that asymmetric array is, in terms of a means of attack on the United States by either a state or a non-state actor who is either unwilling or unable to confront us

directly, the notion of its potential maritime dimension. All of the maritime dimensions within those threats bring the problem of national security for those of us who work in the maritime domain, much closer to home.

Looking at the multitude and the complexity of the threats and challenges we now face, it is almost like preparing to play a game of checkers against a familiar opponent, only to sit down and discover that you're already ten moves into a chess game, but it is a three-dimensional chess game against multiple opponents whose pieces are unconstrained by your previous understanding or whatever their rules of movement were. Such a game would be so unrecognizable that it would be hard for us to even figure out a name for it. That is true of this new era, in which we are responsible for the maritime piece of our total national security profile.

The President has responded to some of the complexities of these challenges by establishing a new cabinet-level position, the Directory of Homeland Security, whose job it is at the moment to coordinate the national effort to protect the homeland against terrorism. Whether or not he realizes it, the other transnational threats are part of that asymmetric array as well.

Much has been written on the issue of homeland security over the past few years. Much of it has been rather narrow in scope, focusing mainly on the notion of homeland defense as opposed to homeland security. That often took it to the Pentagon and left it there as a function of the military. But, this view is much too restrictive as these recent events have proven. The main exception to this rather narrow view was the Commission on National Security Strategy for the 21st Century, otherwise known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, which was published almost a year ago, back in January. Here is what the Hart-Rudman report said in a nutshell: "The United States will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on the American homeland, and U.S. military superiority will not entirely protect us." And it concluded: "The security of the American homeland from the threats of the new century should be the primary national security mission of the U.S. government." It finally recommended: "The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail."

Well, the Commission was right. But, what might such a strategy look like, given that conventional uses of military, economic and diplomatic power – the normal three tools in the quiver of the U.S. arsenal -- would likely not be effective in countering some of those threats. My notion is that some additional capability needs to be married into those other three fundamental arrows in the quiver. I believe that extra arrow is one about civil authority blended with those other forms of state power.

Civil authority has usually been linked mainly with domestic security, rather than national security policy. However, as the Hart-Rudman Commission observed, the distinction between national security policy and domestic security is already beginning to blur, and

in the next quarter century, it could disappear altogether. I think when viewed against transnational and asymmetric threats, such blurring tends to make sense. For example, terrorism has consistently been defined as a criminal act and if terrorists are rooted out from among our own population, they will most likely be tried as criminals, notwithstanding what we saw in the paper this morning associated with the potential for military tribunals. The proper response to a criminal act within our own borders is to simply enforce the law. That is the nature of us as a people and as a country. Yet, we have found it necessary to now also use military means to destroy terrorist organizations that have global reach, and as the President suggests, even the nations who give them refuge.

Similarly, something as simple as inspecting cargo shipments for contraband is an expression first of civil authority, whether the contraband is computer technology, financial instruments, drugs or even weapons of mass destruction. However, that has not prohibited us from using Navy ships as platforms for Coast Guard boarding teams to interdict cocaine shipments headed for the United States, and then take them to the jurisdictional end of criminal prosecution.

We have to be very careful, however, that we do not blur our vision to the point that we lose the big picture. A correct response to these new threats must adhere to the principles of our Constitution and of our rule of law. We must continue to protect civil liberties of our own citizens while we protect their security. That interesting balance is something we have talked a lot about over the last several weeks.

Therefore, if our gut reaction to terrorism or any other threat would be to militarize our borders, we would, to a degree, undermine our own freedoms, and we would hand a victory to the terrorists. Though we can and should use the might of our military to meet these threats at our borders, it must always be used only as necessary to support and aid those who have the responsibility to enforce civil authority inside our country.

Threats to our security at home sadly remain and unfortunately, I think they will continue to grow in this new century. Separately and collectively, they pose dangers to our borders, our economy, our environment and our own safety. All of them have a distinct maritime dimension. They can be conveyed toward our shores in ways that can't always be countered by traditional naval forces. We can't really launch cruise missiles or air strikes at them as they approach. They draw near in civilian vessels that look like and mingle with legitimate commercial and even recreational traffic.

The biggest challenge currently facing our maritime transportation system is how to ensure that legitimate cargo is not unnecessarily delayed as we and other nations introduce some version of an enhanced security profile. Sustained prosperity clearly depends on our accommodating the global trade that is expected to double or triple over the next 20 years. Therefore, government needs to be attentive to finding ways to minimize the disruptions and delays caused by federal inspections and other

requirements. Among the initial factors addressed by the Hart-Rudman Commission was that more stuff has to move through borders faster, so they need to be loosened. The Commission then turned its attention to homeland security. Ensuring homeland security suggests a requirement to tighten those same borders we just suggested needed loosening. Government has an obligation to keep illegal immigrants, drugs, weapons, and other contraband from entering and leaving through those very same ports whose throughput we want to maximize in the interests of our national prosperity. To sustain prosperity, we open ports. To ensure security, we close ports. We clearly need to get beyond that metaphor of an opened or closed port and find a concept that permits both prosperity and security. Prosperity and security should not be competing interests when they serve the transcendent national interest.

Returning to our original question – how in the world do we protect our nation's maritime security in such a dynamic environment against such elusive threats? This is a question that we discussed academically until two months ago. It has now become uniquely and vitally important to us as a nation and as a service. I think it requires a unique answer. I believe we need a systematic approach of complementary security measures to put together an effective strategy of offense and defense on this multi-level chessboard. Of course, we need to think more seriously than ever about how to prevent, how to respond, and how to manage the consequences of any asymmetric threat and its attack. However, as every chess player knows, we need to think first about awareness. The old paradigm of prevention, response and consequence management must now become awareness, prevention, response and consequence management.

Awareness involves recognizing the threats well in advance and anticipating our vulnerabilities and doing something about it. It has to do with having access to detailed intelligence about our would-be adversaries and sharing that information much more effectively among federal agencies and with our domestic and international partners, both in the public and private sectors. Without better awareness of the domain in which we work, for us the maritime domain, we will be forced to take more stringent actions with regard to prevention and response that will close down our economy and threaten our economic security. I don't know about you, but I'm not interested in living in a country with militarized borders. That would be a very different America than the one that our founding fathers envisioned.

As I mentioned earlier, the goal of sustaining global economic prosperity implies a loosening of control at the borders, and on the other hand, ensuring maritime security to prevent catastrophic events suggests a requirement to tighten them. The concept I would offer to unite these goals is an idea that we have at least initially termed "Maritime Domain Awareness". It is unique in that it applies specifically to our maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. Maritime Domain Awareness would be the umbrella that covers all the information requirements of anyone with any responsibility for homeland security in the maritime domain. Applied to the government interest of getting more

cargo through customs and Coast Guard inspectors in less time with greater security, I think its key elements would be these:

- An integrated, accessible database of information poured into by many and accessible by those who need it to get their job done better;
- One-stop coordinated inspections;
- High-technology sensors, readers, gamma ray scanners;
- Very solid and well thought-out risk-based decision-making forums charged with taking on and solving problems.

As we get better at collaborative approaches to maritime security issues, we quickly realize how many agencies and companies have important roles and how varied and complex their information requirements are. Imagine for a moment the information needs associated with a hypothetical 6,000 TEU flag of convenience containership with a multinational crew, cobbled together by a hiring agent who works for an Algerian vessel operator who chartered the vessel from a Greek ship owner whose corporate offices are in the Cayman Islands. You know and I know that happens every day. How would you begin to manage the information required to prosecute an interagency response to any of the various threats that might be aboard such a hypothetical ship? These could include a report of a nuclear device being smuggled; chemical or biological agents; or any of hundreds of other possibilities, all the way down to and including jeans and Levis.

Maritime Domain Awareness can become the forum we use to get our arms around that issue. Its key characteristics would be a system that uses advanced technology to integrate the many and varied efforts of military services, civil agencies, and private sector entities: transparency in the domain from over there internationally to the U.S. port; collaboration among federal agencies; coordination among international, national and local interests; sensitivity to customer service; and risk-based decision-making and facilitation of the incident command system when incidents do arise. The folks over in the Pentagon would refer to this as “jointness plus”, with an emphasis on the plus.

Maritime Domain Awareness tools would have to include solid vulnerability assessments with action plan follow-ups to our ports and a model port guide so that we would know what we were looking for when we did those vulnerability assessments. The model port guide would give special attention to security guidelines, given the challenges of the moment. We would have to exercise contingency plans after they have been built. We also need real-time cargo, people and vessel tracking systems and rigorous analytic models and simulations capable of producing tactically actionable products.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of Maritime Domain Awareness is that it is not just a system of technologies. It has to become an altered state of mind from what we have been comfortable with for so long. It is

constant, unyielding vigilance, and you can't buy that. It has to come from within us as humans. Its most important assets are the eyes and ears of people in the private industry who, by and large, populate and own our ports and waterways. It has to be based on solid interagency and private sector collaboration and coordination at the local level as well as at the national level, which we have found to be of enormous value through not only the MTSNAC, but also the ICMTS at the federal level.

Ladies and gentlemen, what I would like to leave you with is the notion that this is an all-hands evolution. Clearly, each of us has to find a way to make our contribution to this greater security profile for our country. I do believe that continuously advanced, integrated information systems offer us our closest point of approach to some kind of sustainable advantage against 21st century threats. They also offer us the best chance of managing the collaboration I spoke of earlier. This is an enormous undertaking. We knew it back in 1999 we, as MTS colleagues, first recommended it for the Congressional consideration.

Thus armed, I believe we could then take a solid risk-management approach to the many vessels approaching our country on a daily basis, to figure out which ones need to be boarded and where, based on the greatest threats they would represent in the risk-based decision-making paradigm.

We can also have a notion of incentivizing those who would do the right thing and challenge not only them, but ourselves, to find ways to identify the good guys and, in fact, help them get through the gauntlet they encounter in our daily port management processes. As we gradually achieve greater maritime domain awareness, it will enhance homeland security by allowing us to push our borders offshore, away from the coastline, by sharing information on international arrivals and departures within the United States and among our partners around the world. I do believe, when done right and with that kind of information armament, we would be in the business of helping to prevent future attacks. It will also help us by telling us what is going on daily in our ports and waterways. Events that very well could have escaped the attention of many, only observable by some, but with an information system that is shared much more dramatically – we could all be privy to those pieces of information that might be helpful to us as we try to do our jobs. International and domestic cooperation, both civil and military, is essential in this regard because we can't hope to ensure our security by working alone or by waiting until the threats have already crossed the thresholds and are inside our ports.

Awareness is the key to preventing the potential threats from being realized and finding ourselves managing consequences when we could have been in the business of preventing things from happening. Better technology will help us forge a stronger key to that.

Thank you for your attention and I look forward to any questions you have and to the remarks from the other panel members this morning.

Summary of Q&A Session:

Q: You mentioned that one perception is that tight security works against free trade and slows things up. However, the one place where you think there might be some common ground is information technology. Information technology is critical to improving the efficiency of the maritime transportation system. Information technology is critical to improving security. There is obviously a lot of overlap. My question is: How far do you think we have to go to improving the various information technology components of both to, at least on the security side, improve this awareness and be able to head off the most likely problems?

Loy: I wish I had a finite answer to that question, but I think we will all labor in the business of attempting to find the limit associated with the question asked. However, in the meantime, I think in our domain it is fundamentally about vessels, people and cargo. The first level of cooperation I believe has to do with forging a fused database that would allow a greater transparency and a greater visibility associated with the vessels, people and cargo that are coming in our direction. We have been working for a year now with a small group out at our Intelligence Coordination Center. (And, I can tell you that over the course of a year before that, we were not having an easy time finding the right sponsor that would advocate what we were trying to get accomplished.) However, we did, at the tail end of the last administration and about November of last year, begin this little cell of attempting to find out what is possible in terms of learning more about what ought to be in that fused database. We are working with INS and with the visa end of the State Department about the people piece. We, of course, have an enormous database, especially with our colleagues on the vessel piece, and the Customs Service is the lead agency with respect to cargo.

My notion is relatively simple. If we can find better visibility with respect to that which is coming in our direction -- the vessel with the crew on board and with the cargo on board -- then we have a better chance of making a thoughtful and appropriate intervention if one is deemed necessary. Some vessels become "high interest" just because of either their cargo or the number of people onboard. To me, a cruise ship with 4,000 people on it is, by definition, a high interest vessel in the security climate we live in today. As I mentioned earlier, as our first course of business over these last seven weeks, we have attempted to find ways to control the movement of high interest vessels in our ports. We are considering and moving forward on ideas such as Sea Marshals and Maritime Safety and Security Teams that can be deployed appropriately for intervention potential whenever that would be appropriate.

In the meantime, we need to gain better insight as to vessels, people and cargo. Frankly, I think the cargo piece is the biggest hole at the moment, specifically the 17 million containers a year coming in our direction -- 16,000 containers a day finding their way into U.S. ports -- being lifted onto trucks, trains or whatever, and eventually going on to their destination. Only 1-2% of these are physically opened to determine what is actually in them. We have to again find a way to reward the compliant good guys with an incentivizing process that facilitates their cargo getting past

whatever the gauntlet might be at any given border.

However, we absolutely have to be concerned about high interest vessels plus. It is the "plus" piece that offers insights that can be gathered from a fused database when you have 12 vessels approaching the port of X on any given day – which one or two are we going to scrub to bare metal at the sea buoy to make sure that we have no problems based on what we know about the vessel inbound.

Let me give you a quick simple "for instance" -- let's take Vessel A coming from Lisbon to Savannah. In our database we know that the port of call before Lisbon was Barenquia, Colombia. We find out, as a result of the liaison we now have with INS and the State Department, that the third mate and the fourth engineer have records in drug smuggling. The Customs Service tells us they have some amount of concern about the fourth container over in the sixth stack that was put aboard that vessel in Barenquia. All of a sudden, we have not one little red flag (as was often the case in the past), based on where it had been before, but several red flags, some of which are outside the routine Coast Guard risk management decision-making process as to which vessels are cause for concern. For vessels that are outside the inventory of high interest vessels, a decision to take a hard look at a vessel that otherwise would have gotten through, will be based on three or more pieces of information.

I don't know what the limit of either the potential for information sharing and its value will be; but I'm absolutely convinced that to get on with that task an essential ingredient is this awareness piece. Personally, I'm convinced that piece was the failure we watched happen on the 11th of September. We have, as a nation, been in this prevention - response - consequence management paradigm for a long, long time. That is not what failed on the 11th of September. What failed was being inadequately aware of the domain in which we live and work so as to be better able to design prevention protocols or response protocols, should they become necessary.

I wish I had a finite answer to the question; however, I am absolutely convinced that information sharing of a highly sophisticated nature is going to be key to holding on to both a higher security profile and a facilitated commerce flow through our ports and waterways.

Q: In the discussion on homeland defense, we talk about the need to harden our ports domestically, but in fact, for any good security program here with regard to port security, we need to look at the ports of origin. Particularly in the discussion of WMDs, if a device is already brought into our ports, we may have already lost in our effort to protect against it. To what degree do you believe the Coast Guard needs to focus its attention on (1) identifying the vulnerabilities of foreign ports; (2) working with the IMO to establish minimum standards of security; and (3) provide such technical and financial assistance to foreign ports in order to bring them up to a standard comparable to what we enjoy here in the United States?

Loy: I'm not sure I want them to come up to the standard that we enjoy here in

the United States. I think I would like to have them a lot higher than that. That said, your point is enormously on target. This transparency piece that I mentioned earlier in my remarks is all about point of origin as part of the solution and the challenge that we have is an international challenge, not a national one. There are some very good voices with some very thoughtful and deliberate thinking going on as we speak. It is enormously important that it be an opportunity for as many good voices as possible to be brought to the table to figure out the technological end, as well as the conceptual, philosophical end. It is important to have confidence in the point of origin as part of the solution to the security profile and the security challenge we have here in the United States.

I called IMO officials on the 12th of September and said that it seems to me that the devotion that IMO has given to safety and environmental protection over the years has been good and we have all benefited from that. But, it also seems to me, in the wake of 11 September, that a third primary role that IMO can play (or certainly find room for within the structure of IMO's committees) is to pay attention to security – to make security a third major objective of the maritime sector's international standard-setting organization. I found that IMO was, in fact, already ahead of me in the mind-set with respect to this issue. IMO will introduce a major resolution at the assembly at the end of this month. In fact, I will lead the U.S. delegation over there for all next week and the following week. We have already orchestrated the initial interventions from the plenary on that occasion to challenge the process to not only be a focus of IMO's work, but one on an accelerated time schedule so that we are not looking at five years down the road to action. I want to have something happen in the way of an action plan right away.

I will introduce an intervention to that resolution that calls for intercessional work before the March meeting, on the way to setting the agenda for the MSC the next time around. That is a combination of committees and subcommittees. The legal committee will probably be involved; the facilitation committee will be involved; and probably MSC as opposed to MEPC. The notion of international reality and standard-setting is underway and I hope that will be a very aggressive posture that comes out of a resolution next week.

Thank you very much for your attention and I wish you well as we carry on the agenda of the MTS that we started several years ago.